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Executive summary 
This evidence sets out several legal consequences of current UN stabilization activities. 
Stabilization is an area of contemporary, cross-cutting UN activity that involves a range of UN 
actors such as UNDPO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, UNDP, FAO, UNFPA and more. 
The UK can use its existing knowledge base, found in the UK Stabilisation Unit, and its key 
leadership role at the UN to (re)shape UN stabilization practice towards civilian-led and 
bottom-up activities. By pursuing a reformulation of stabilization, the UK would be able to 
strengthen its position in the UN, promote the Government strategy of ‘Global Britain’, and 
empower local people affected by conflict to build greater multilateral cooperation in regions 
where the UN implements stabilization. 
 
About the author 
Dr Alexander Gilder is a Lecturer in Law at Royal Holloway, University of London where 
he is also affiliated with the Royal Holloway Centre for International Security. He specialises 
in public international law and has published in a variety of areas related to international peace 
and security. His current research looks at themes related to stabilization in UN peacekeeping 
including robust force, counterterrorism, and the effect of militarisation on other mandated 
tasks, such as entrenching the rule of law.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Stabilization within UN peacekeeping is an area of UN policy which the UK can 
prioritise to maintain a leading role at the UN and promote the Government’s ‘Global 
Britain’ narrative. UN peacekeeping is one of the integral and cross-cutting multilateral 
activities undertaken by the UN for maintaining international peace and security and 
involves a range of UN agencies and partners. This document suggests the FCO should 
focus UK engagement and reform efforts on (re)shaping stabilization to have a profound 
impact on a broad range of UN activities. 
 
1.2 The UK acts as a penholder on country and thematic areas, mainly alongside France and 
the US, adopting a key leadership role in the Security Council giving the UK space to 
provide direction for changes in UN policy. But recent research has shown Brexit will 
make it difficult for the UK to maintain its current influence internationally. Gifkins, 
Jarvis and Ralph have suggested the UK should prioritise making specific policy 
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suggestions and take a collaborative approach on penholding to protect the UK’s 
legitimacy as a leading figure at the UN.1 
 
1.3 Stabilization is now a buzzword at the UN and forms the basis for much of the discussion 
on peacekeeping. To illustrate, the term was mentioned in 10% of Council meetings in 
2001 but by 2014 ‘stabilization’ was mentioned in 44%.2 However, there is not a 
consistent UN-wide understanding of stabilization. The UK could take the lead on 
establishing a civilian-led understanding of stabilization that would influence the 
activities of a broad range of UN actors allowing the UK to leave a positive mark on UN 
peacekeeping. 
 
2. Stabilization at the UN 
 
2.1 UN peace operations are mandated by the UN Security Council but are an activity 
involving a broad range of UN actors and cooperation with the wider UN Country Team 
that fall within the remit of this inquiry. Particularly activities that pursue stabilization 
are often undertaken in cooperation with actors such as UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, 
UNDP, FAO, UNFPA and more. This makes it a prime area for the UK to exert its 
influence and make a positive difference to UN deployments that affect countless 
individuals experiencing daily insecurity. Despite Security Council paralysis being 
mentioned several times in this Committee’s session on 23 June 2020 there have been 
significant shifts in the mandates and activities of UN peacekeeping over the last decade. 
 
2.2 In 2015 the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report stated, “[t]he 
term “stabilization” has a wide range of interpretations, and the Panel believes the usage 
of that term by the United Nations requires clarification.”3 The UN has not formally 
adopted a definition of the term or clear policy guidelines on what activities a 
stabilization mission will entail. In practice, the operations that use the term stabilization 
have a range of different activities in their mandates. Some UN officials say that no 
specific significance should be given to the fact that some missions have been designated 
‘stabilization’ missions, but this is clearly inadequate when the High-Level Panel have 
requested a definition.4 
 
2.3 Four UN peace operations have included stabilization in their title since 2004:  
 the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH (2004 – 2017), 
 
1 Jess Gifkins, Samuel Jarvis, Jason Ralph, ‘Global Britain in the United Nations’ (UNA-UK 2019) 
p.4. Available here. 
2 David Curran and Paul Holtom, ‘Resonating, Rejecting, Reinterpreting: Mapping the Stabilization 
Discourse in the United Nations Security Council, 2000-14’ 4(1) Stability: International Journal of 
Security & Development 1-18, p.9. Available here. 
3 UN Security Council and UN General Assembly, ‘Identical letters dated 17 June 2015 from the 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the 
Security Council’ (17 June 2015) A/70/95–S/2015/446 para 114. 
4 Cedric de Coning, ‘Is stabilization the new normal? Implications of stabilization mandates for the 
use of force in UN peacekeeping operations’ in: Peter Nadin (ed) The use of force in UN 
peacekeeping (Routledge 2018) 85–99, p.87. 
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 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, MONUSCO (1999 – present, established as MONUC and renamed 
MONUSCO to include stabilization in 2010), 
 the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 
MINUSMA (2013 – present) and, 
 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central 
African Republic, MINUSCA (2014 – present). 
 
2.4 My research has shown that, with the exclusion of MINUSTAH, the three ongoing 
stabilization missions have a notable congruence in their mandates which denote a 
somewhat similar starting point in the UN’s approach to stabilization.5 First, they are 
mandated to support the extension of state authority. Second, they operate alongside state 
forces and actively build the capacity of those forces. Third, they use varying degrees of 
proactive, ‘robust’ force to prevent attacks on themselves and those they are mandated to 
protect. Lastly, they have mandates to support (re)establishing the rule of law. 
 
3. The legal ramifications of current UN stabilization practice  
 
2.1 I have carried out case studies of MINUSMA and MINUSCA revealing stark legal 
implications for current stabilization-focused mandates.6 
 
(1) Robust force: 
 
There are examples where UN peacekeepers have taken the initiative in the use of 
force in the pursuit of stabilization. This contradicts the traditional understanding 
that peacekeepers may only use force in self-defence or defence of the mandate. 
Mandates to extend state authority and stabilise population centres using robust 
force risks intensifying the conflict, which could have a negative impact on 
civilians. 
 
The UN is toeing a fine line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement when the 
HIPPO Panel has drawn attention to the implication of straying toward 
enforcement.7 The Force Intervention Brigade deployed as part of MONUSCO has 
a distinct offensive peace enforcement mandate.8 Under the peace enforcement 
mandate the Brigade may be partial and expressly take sides in the conflict between 
a state and armed groups affirming the state as the legitimate authority. But 
MINUSCA and MINUSMA are not defined as peace enforcement missions, are 
 
5 See e.g. Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47-73. Available Open Access here. 
6 See Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47-73; Alexander Gilder, ‘Human 
security and the stabilization mandate of MINUSCA’ (2020) International Peacekeeping 1-32. 
Available here. 
7 UN Security Council and UN General Assembly, ‘Identical letters dated 17 June 2015 from the 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the 
Security Council’ (17 June 2015) A/70/95–S/2015/446, para 122 
8 UN Security Council, Resolution 2098 (28 March 2013) para 12. 
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meant to be impartial actors that do not use offensive force, and yet have mandates 
to that use similar wording: to extend state authority and stabilise population centres 
which is achieved through actions such as a ‘robust posture’ and active patrolling to 
deter armed groups and allow space for the restoration of state authorities.9 
 
A much clearer distinction needs to be drawn between peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping in relation to stabilization.10 The UN currently risks setting 
extremely high expectations amongst the local population that highly capable forces 
will fight a war and proactively respond to atrocities. There is also the risk that some 
portions of the population will be disillusioned by enforcement troops that act in a 
partial manner and the UN needs to more clearly demarcate the distinction. 
 
(2) International humanitarian law: 
 
Intensifying the conflict can also make the UN a party to the conflict under 
international humanitarian law.11 For example, MINUSMA has been mandated 
to engage in ‘direct operations’ and it has been supported by sophisticated military 
hardware such as short-range drones and attack helicopters.12 In addition, the 
mandate renewal in 2018 specified that MINUSMA is to conduct joint operations 
and share information with the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF).13 
Where there are sustained, direct clashes between MINUSMA and armed groups it 
would be difficult for the UN to contest the applicability of humanitarian law. 
 
Peacekeepers can also become a party to the conflict where sufficient support is 
provided to host state forces. Where providing support the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) argues UN forces can be deemed a party to a pre-existing 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) under the following circumstances; 
 
1. there is a pre-existing NIAC taking place on the territory in which 
multinational forces are called on to intervene;  
2. actions related to the conduct of hostilities are undertaken by multinational 
forces in the context of the pre-existing conflict;  
3. the military operations of multinational forces are carried out in support (as 
described above) of a party to the pre-existing conflict; and  
 
9 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic’ (2 June 
2017) S/2017/473, para 2; UN Security Council, Resolution 2301 (26 July 2016) S/RES/2301 paras 
34, 34(a); UN Security Council, Resolution 2364 (29 June 2017) S/RES/2364 para 19; UN 
Security Council, Resolution 2164 (25 June 2014) S/RES/2164 para 13(a)(i). 
10 Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47-73, pp. 55-56. 
11 Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47-73, pp. 56-59; See also Stephen 
Mathias, ‘UN peacekeeping today: legal challenges and uncertainties’ (2017) Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 18(2) 138-153. 
12 Erwan de Cherisey, ‘Desert watchers: MINUSMA’s intelligence capabilities’ (2017) Jane’s 
Defence Weekly 54(23). 
13 UN Security Council, Resolution 2423 (28 June 2018), S/RES/2423 para 38(b). 
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4. the action in question is undertaken pursuant to an official decision by the 
troop-contributing country or the relevant organization to support a party 
involved in the pre-existing conflict.14 
 
The ICRC claims that meeting these criteria displays a ‘genuine belligerent 
intent’ which would result in participation in hostilities and liability under 
international humanitarian law. 
 
Becoming a party to the conflict would remove the protections afforded to UN 
peacekeepers under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel and would mean they are legitimate military targets.  
 
(3) Counterterrorism: 
 
MINUSMA currently provides support for the French Operation Barkhane and 
regional force (G-5 Sahel Force) that are offensively fighting terrorism in the Sahel. 
MINUSMA has a sophisticated intelligence unit (ASIFU) staffed by NATO 
contingents which reportedly shares its targeting packs with the French forces. In 
the name of stabilization, MINUSMA is mandated to use robust force under Chapter 
VII and to provide support and intelligence to the G-5 Sahel Force and Operation 
Barkhane. MINUSMA’s Chapter VII mandate is consequently linked to 
supporting a regional counterterrorism operation which uses offensive force 
with the open encouragement of the UN Security Council.15 
 
(4) UN responsibility for wrongful acts: 
 
UN peacekeepers have increasingly cooperated with host state forces. By working 
alongside the host state, the UN takes sides in a civil war and fails to act with any 
sense of impartiality. Where, in the eyes of individuals and communities, the UN 
cooperates with a state which has previously committed human rights violations the 
UN could lose the trust of sections of the population. Going further, the active UN 
support for Malian and Central African Republic forces could have legal 
ramifications where the host state forces commit serious breaches of human rights 
or humanitarian law.16 It is possible that the UN could be found responsible under 
Article 14 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations 
for aiding or assisting a state in committing a wrongful act.17 It is unclear how 
much support would need to be provided by the UN to result in liability but support 
 
14 ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’ 
(32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 8–10 December 2015), p.23. 
15 Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47-73, pp. 59-64. 
16 For example, Central African forces (FACA) have committed human rights abuses see Alexander 
Gilder, ‘Human security and the stabilization mandate of MINUSCA’ (2020) International 
Peacekeeping 1-32, p.17.  
17 Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47-73, p.66. 
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has continued to be provided during the operation of MINUSCA and MINUSMA 
despite violations of international law being committed by the host state forces. 
 
4. What role for the UK in determining the path forward? 
 
4.1 The UK currently has the cross-government Stabilisation Unit. The Stabilisation Unit 
informs its deployees to UN missions that it is common to find there is no shared and 
coordinated vision of stabilization. The Stabilisation Unit does though have a common 
definition of stabilization as,  
“… an activity undertaken as an initial response to violence or the immediate 
threat of violence … when undertaking stabilisation interventions, the UK 
seeks to protect the means of survival and restore basic security, promote and 
support a political process to reduce violence as well as prepare a foundation 
for longer term stability”18 
The UK focuses on a civilian-led approach to stabilization which is supported by the 
military. Conversely, the US takes a narrower approach where the goal of stabilization is 
to support the legitimate authority in securing the monopoly on the use of force to enable 
the authority to protect its population. The US aims to use the military to defeat an 
insurgency while entrenching support for a domestically owned transition towards peace. 
 
4.2 There are similarities between the UK and US approaches with both identifying a 
legitimate authority to which support is provided and the capacity building of the 
authority to be able to deflect spoilers to peace but there are divergent views on the role 
of the military in pursuit of stabilization. The UK Stabilisation Unit further stresses that 
in a destabilised state there will likely be a number of parties vying for control through 
force.19 As a result, a decision will need to be taken with regard to who with and how to 
work in the environment. The UK Stabilisation Unit encourages flexibility in this regard. 
The host state government may not be the most suitable actor to provide stabilization 
services and the UK approach ensures there is legitimacy at the local level.20 
 
4.3 What I have found in my work is that the UN currently adopts a two-step approach to 
stabilization: (1) force is used to deter or displace armed groups and (2) civilian-led 
 
18 UK Stabilisation Unit, ‘The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy 
makers and practitioners’ (March 2019) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78
4001/The_UK_Government_s_Approach_to_Stabilisation_A_guide_for_policy_makers_and_practiti
oners.pdf> pp. 13-4. 
19 UK Stabilisation Unit, ‘The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014)’ (May 2014) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78
4001/The_UK_Government_s_Approach_to_Stabilisation_A_guide_for_policy_makers_and_practiti
oners.pdf>  p.2. 
20 UK Stabilisation Unit, ‘The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy 
makers and practitioners’ (March 2019) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78
4001/The_UK_Government_s_Approach_to_Stabilisation_A_guide_for_policy_makers_and_practiti
oners.pdf> p.124. 
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peacebuilding activities, aimed at entrenching the rule of law and re-establishing the host 
state government as the legitimate authority, take place in the power vacuum left 
behind.21 This current approach is partially the root of many of the legal problems 
outlined above. There is an overriding focus on UN use of force and promoting the 
position of the host state government which is distinctly less flexible than the UK’s 
understanding of stabilization. 
 
4.4 My research has shown UN stabilization missions do, to a certain extent, build peace 
from the bottom-up and empower local people.22 For instance, the empowerment of 
women is a regular priority and is followed up on by the mission reporting. There are 
also numerous other examples with peace conferences to facilitate dialogue, local peace 
committees, community-based workshops to teach conflict management, the promotion 
of women’s organisations and mandates to support the inclusion of civil society, and 
youth groups in the implementation of peace agreements.23 However, while the UN 
implements some wider empowerment related strategies, either on its own or in 
partnership with host governments, local, civilian-led activities do not feature as focal 
points of the missions. 
 
4.5 The UK’s existing expertise could be harnessed to nudge UN stabilization practice 
towards a more flexible, primarily civilian-led process that has local legitimacy, reduces 
conflict, and improves human security. This would allow the UK to influence a major 
area of cross-cutting UN practice that involves countless UN agencies and programmes. 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf told this Committee that France have a more engaging 
relationship in Africa than the UK and Ambassador Bermann suggested there should be 
further cooperation in Africa to avoid leaving the continent to China – greater leadership 
on stabilization could achieve this. Providing leadership on stabilization that veers UN 
practice away from war-fighting would show the global community the UK is committed 
to peace. It would also demonstrate UK commitment to working with communities and 
promote a wide range of actors in the decision-making processes. 
 
5. Key recommendations:  
 
5.1 The UK should take the lead on establishing a comprehensive UN understanding of 
stabilization that is primarily focused on civilian-led activities and taps into the 
UK’s existing knowledge base. This would strengthen a key area of contemporary, 
cross-cutting UN activity that involves a range of UN actors such as UNDPO, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, UNDP, FAO, UNFPA and more. The UK would be 
 
21 Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47-73, pp. 51-52. 
22 Alexander Gilder, ‘Human security and the stabilization mandate of MINUSCA’ (2020) 
International Peacekeeping 1-32. 
23 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan’ (8 November 2013) 
S/2013/651 para 39; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan’ (17 
February 2015) S/2015/118 para 29; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on South 
Sudan’ (21 August 2015) S/2015/655 para 35; UN Security Council, Resolution 2100 (25 April 2013) 
S/RES/2100 paras 16(b)(iii), 25; UN Security Council, Resolution 2295 (29 June 2016) S/RES/2295 
para 26; UN Security Council, Resolution 2227 (29 June 2015) S/RES/2227 para 14(c). 
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able to strengthen its position in the UN and promote the Government’s ‘Global 
Britain’ narrative. 
 
5.2 UK needs to be actively aware of the legal implications of current multilateral 
stabilization activities. The UK can use its influence to (re)shape the mandates to 
refocus attention on positive bottom-up activities that empower local people 
affected by conflict and build greater multilateral cooperation regions where the 
UN implements stabilization. 
 
5.3 The UK must not lose knowledge from the UK Stabilisation Unit during the 
DFID/FCO merger. The Stabilisation Unit is key to continue promoting 
stabilization practice focused on civilian-led activities. 
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